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Into the Danger Zone: Massey v. City of Charlotte and the
Fate of Conditional Zoning in North Carolina
Of all the dramatic growth in North Carolina's urban areas in the
past decade,' the most startling changes have occurred in
Mecklenburg County, where the ascension of local banks has fueled a
development explosion In an attempt to channel the flood of
residential and commercial development, the City of Charlotte
enacted a zoning procedure, featuring a single public hearing, that
encouraged neighborhood participation while remaining friendly to
developers.' The streamlined process enabled developers to
negotiate with residents and incorporate compromises into the zoning
proposal Proponents of this purely legislative approach to zoning
1. The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy ranked
North Carolina as the sixth fastest growing state in the nation. See BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION CENTER ON URBAN AND METROPOLITAN POLICY, ADDING IT UP:
GROWTH TRENDS AND POLICIES IN NORTH CAROLINA 1 (July 2000) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter ADDING IT UP]. This growth centers largely on
the state's metropolitan areas. Id. at 2. In the 1980s and 1990s the state's seven largest
urban areas gained over seventy percent of the state's new residents; the three largest
metropolitan clusters-Charlotte, Raleigh-Durham, and Greensboro/Winston-Salem-
accounted for sixty-three percent of the state's population growth between 1980 and 1998.
Id. at 4. Between 1992 and 1997, the state ranked fifth in the number of acres developed.
Id. at 11. North Carolina's population increased by 1.4 million people in the 1990s,
constituting a 21.4% growth rate during that decade. Scott Dodd, Slow Answers to Rapid
Growth, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 7, 2001, at 1B [hereinafter Dodd, Slow Answers].
One out of every five North Carolina residents did not live in the state ten years ago. Id.
2. Lauren Markoe, Albemarle Road Zoning Draws Suit, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Dec. 17, 1999, at lB. In 1980, Mecklenburg County had a population of 404,270. By 1996,
the figure had ballooned nearly fifty percent to 597,339. Mecklenburg County, N.C.,
Estimated Population by Census Tract, at www.charmeck.nc.us/ciplanning/complan/
demographics/estpopulation.htm (last visited May 15, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). By 2000, the Charlotte metropolitan area, consisting primarily of
Mecklenburg County, had a population of about 1,000,000, up twenty-five percent since
1990. Chris Burritt, Ruling Tossing Out Zoning Process Raises Ire in Charlotte, ATLANTA
J. CONST., May 1, 2000, at B4. As the director of the UNC Charlotte Urban Institute
observed, "There are more people moving here than anyone ever thought." Dodd, Slow
Answers, supra note 1. According to the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, 7838 new
businesses arrived in Charlotte between 1988 and 1998, creating more than 68,000 jobs and
76.2 million square feet of work space. Paul Nowell, Judge Orders Charlotte to Overhaul
Its Fast-Track Rules on Development; At Least 50 Projects Are Now On Hold, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 22, 2000, § 1, at 5.
3. Charlotte adopted its current zoning code in 1991. See CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE
OF ORDINANCES §§ 6.101-6.208 (2000), http://www.municode.com (last visited May 15,
2001).
4. See Scott Dodd, Real Battle Waged Out of Sight, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 9,
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applaud its flexibility, efficiency, and capacity to nourish
"compromise and consensus" between developers and residents-two
groups with vastly disproportionate power and resources.5
In Massey v. City of Charlotte, however, Superior Court Judge
Ben Tennille of the North Carolina Business Court invalidated
Charlotte's zoning process, halting development in its bulldozer
tracks.6 Albemarle Land Company filed a petition in June 1999 to
rezone approximately forty-two acres along Albemarle Road in
Charlotte from residential to commercial use.7  Despite the
company's concessions, local residents resisted the development and
filed a petition against the application.8 In the face of opposition
from the zoning board, the planning commission, and its own
planning staff,9 the Charlotte City Council, in a single legislative
hearing, voted six-to-five to approve the rezoning and issue a
2000, at 1A [hereinafter Dodd, Real Battle Waged].
5. See, e.g., Record at 103, Massey v. City of Charlotte, No. COAO0-905 (N.C. Ct.
App. filed May 16, 2000) (affidavit of Fred Ernest Bryant) (conveying his belief that the
process "creates avenues and opportunities for compromise and consensus-building"); id.
at 106 (affidavit of Haywood Bush) (articulating his opinion that a legislative process
"encourages compromise" between developers and neighboring residents); id. at 105
(affidavit of Stan Campbell) (stating his belief that a legislative process "encourages ...
consensus and compromise"); id. at 110 (affidavit of Mark C. Cramer) (asserting that a
legislative process "encourages and facilitates a search for compromise and consensus"
among the developer, local residents, and elected officials). Homeowners' groups, such as
the North Carolina Homeowners Association, have failed to match the developers'
lobbying clout. See Ames Alexander, They Are Used to Getting Their Way, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Dec. 9, 1998, at 19A (describing the lobbying success of the North Carolina
Home Builders Association).
6. See Massey v. City of Charlotte, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 4, 22 (Apr. 17, 2000),
available at www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions; Nowell, supra note 2. Although the
decision applies to the entire state, it invalidated a zoning process that was unique to
Charlotte. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
7. Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 2. The company intended to build a retail center
featuring a Target and a Lowe's Home Improvement Warehouse and proposed a 100-foot
buffer between the new construction and adjacent property. Id.
8. Id. Neighborhood residents opposed the retail center development because they
feared it would depress the property value of their homes and affect their quality of life.
See, e.g., Record at 129, Massey (No. COA00-905) (affidavit of Richard Gilbert) (listing
five factors caused by the development that negatively affected neighborhood residents,
including light pollution, noise pollution, and diminution of property value); see also id. at
122-23 (affidavit of Bethanie C. Massey) (citing an increase in noise, light, and traffic); id.
at 125-126 (affidavit of Ragan Ryoti) (expressing fear for her children's safety and
concerns about a loss of privacy and erosion of the "neighborhood atmosphere").
9. Markoe, supra note 2. In the words of city planners, the approved plan violated
"all adopted land-use plans and policies for the area." Scott Dodd, City Invites New
Zoning Ideas, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 3, 2000, at 3B [hereinafter Dodd, City
Invites]. One neighbor wondered, "Why have a planning staff? Why have a zoning
committee? What's the point if nobody pays attention?" Markoe, supra note 2.
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conditional use permit to Albermarle. 1° One month later, frustrated
neighboring residents sought judicial review of the decision via writ of
certiorari."
The North Carolina Business Court granted certiorari and struck
down Charlotte's conditional use district zoning ordinance. Judge
Ben Tennille determined that Charlotte's purely legislative procedure
for approving the rezoning exceeded its authority under state law.'2
Proper execution of conditional use district zoning, the court
concluded, requires a two-step process: (1) a legislative hearing
regarding rezoning, and (2) a quasi-judicial hearing regarding the
issuance of a conditional use permit. 3 Because Charlotte ignored the
quasi-judicial element, its zoning decision concerning the Albemarle
tract and subsequent decisions employing the same process were
deemed invalid. 4
The Massey decision casts doubt on Charlotte's efforts to shape
future development.' A reliable, predictable, and unquestionably
legal zoning process is crucial to managing the city's emergence as
one of the country's fastest growing metropolitan areas. 6 Legal
setbacks like Massey cost developers time and treasure in one of the
nation's tightest markets for office space.'
7
10. Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 2; Scott Dodd, 17 Fought City Hall on Zoning and
Won, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 19, 2000, at IA [hereinafter Dodd, 17 Fought City
Hall]. Lynn Wheeler, one of the two Council members who remain in office, admitted she
"just didn't pay attention" to the proposal. Id. In an approach unique in the state,
Charlotte began using a single-step conditional use zoning procedure in 1991. See Massey,
2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 24; supra note 3; infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
11. Quasi-judicial zoning decisions, including the issuance of conditional use permits,
are subject to judicial review. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381(c) (1999) ("[E]very such
decision of the city council shall be subject to review by the superior court by proceedings
in the nature of certiorari."). Acting on a motion from the Superior Court judge presiding
over the case, the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court designated the
dispute as a complex business case and assigned it to the North Carolina Business Court.
N.C. Sup. CT. R. 2.1(a) (empowering the Chief Justice to designate any dispute as a
complex business case on the motion of a party or the presiding trial judge).
12. Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 22.
13. Id. ll.
14. Id. 35.
15. See Nowell, supra note 2.
16. Id. (citing an estimate from Area Development magazine). In the next twenty
years, the Charlotte area reportedly will grow by as much as thirty-seven percent. See
ADDING IT UP, supra note 1, at 4.
17. See Nowell, supra note 2. This delay postponed new development for much of the
2000 summer, forcing some developers to pay carrying costs on land they owned pending
rezoning. J. Lee Howard, Court Decision Puts Developers in Limbo, BUS. J. OF
CHARLOTTE, Apr. 21, 2000, at 3 [hereinafter Howard, Developers in Limbo]. The large
backlog is exacerbated by the fact that Charlotte frequently uses conditional zoning-
approximately eighty percent of the rezoning cases considered by the city council employ
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Cognizant of this pressure, Charlotte reacted swiftly to the
Massey decision.18 Within weeks, the planning commission sponsored
public forums to educate developers and neighborhood activists
about the city's options.19 Local officials wanted to avoid a complete
overhaul of the one-step rezoning process, which had midmived
Charlotte's emergence as an urban center? Instead, they merely
sought to "fix what is specifically directed and required by the
[Massey decision]." 1  They also wanted to preserve the "open
process" and "good communication" between elected officials,
developers, and neighborhood groups.22 By creating a "high level of
legal certainty" in the new rezoning process, they hoped to avoid
future judicial rulings that could derail development and lead to
this process. See J. Lee Howard, City Gets Bill Passed to Aid Rezoning, Bus. J. OF
CHARLOTrE, July 7, 2000, at 8. According to Keith MacVean, the Land Development
Coordinator for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission, between 1997 and
1999, the City of Charlotte considered 254 conditional zoning requests, compared to 74
general district proposals. Record at 112-13, Massey v. City of Charlotte, No. COA00-905
(N.C. Ct. App. filed May 16, 2000) (affidavit of Keith MacVean). At the end of 1999,
there were twenty-eight buildings with 4.4 million square feet of office space under
construction, including office towers of nineteen and thirty-two stories. Id. Massey
resulted in the indefinite suspension of forty-seven active rezoning cases. See Scott Dodd
& Lauren Markoe, Stop Sign for Development, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Apr. 18, 2000, at
1A; see also Charlotte Plans Appeal of Ruling on Zoning, MORNING STAR (Wilmington,
N.C.), Apr. 26,2000, at 3B (reporting that the decision froze about fifty projects involving
several hundred million dollars).
18. See Dodd, City Invites, supra note 9.
19. See id.; Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission, Conditional Rezoning
Process, at www.charmeck.nc.us/ciplanninglrezsub/rezoninglnewcdrezoningprocess/
conditionalrezoningprocess.htm (last modified May 9, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). The city's planning director strongly supported the single-step
process, and the planning board reluctantly developed a two-step procedure in the hope
that it would not become necessary. Scott Dodd, Zoning Proposal Will Look Familiar,
CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, June 6,2000, at 1B [hereinafter Dodd, Zoning Proposal].
20. See Burritt, supra note 2.
21. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission, Conditional Rezoning Process
Guiding Principles, at www.charmeck.nc.us/ciplanning/rezsub/rezoning/newcdrezoning
process/guidingprincp.htm (last modified May 9, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. Martin Cramton, Charlotte's Planning
Director, wanted to revise the single-step system to ensure greater community
involvement and closer attention to overall land-use plans (the crucial provisions of the
eventual legislative fix in July). See Act to Permit Mecklenburg County to Engage in
Conditional Zoning, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 77; Act to Permit the City of Charlotte and the
Towns of Cornelius, Davidson, Huntersville, Matthews, Mint Hill, and Pineville to Engage
in Conditional Zoning, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 84; Dodd, Zoning Proposal, supra note 19.
22. Guiding Principles, supra note 21. This principle reflects an aversion to conflict
characteristic of North Carolina's business community. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text. Opponents of the quasi-judicial step also worry that "adversarial
[conditional] use hearings leave a bad image" for the city. Chapel Hill Town Council
meeting, Oct. 18,2000 (statement of Lane Kendig).
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instability.23  Encouraged and joined by the Albemarle Land
Company, Charlotte appealed the Massey decision. Further, officials
turned to the North Carolina General Assembly for help in passing a
law that enabled Mecklenburg County and its six municipalities to
perpetuate their existing zoning process.24 The law approved a
process similar to the one Judge Tennille invalidated, but added a
handful of precautions to address concerns raised by the court's
ruling.5 Because this authorization expires in August 2001,26 real
estate development in Charlotte continues on uncertain footing as
developers appeal the decision.27
23. Guiding Principles, supra note 21. The climate of uncertainty may be traced to
Charlotte's decision to use an exclusively legislative zoning process, which probed the
procedural limits established under North Carolina case law. See infra notes 56-68 and
accompanying text. "When you create an aura of uncertainty," noted one executive
contemplating new construction in Charlotte, "it can make it difficult, if not impossible, to
do business." Howard, Developers in Limbo, supra note 17 (quoting Jeff Brotman,
chairman of Costco Cos., Inc.). Charlotte's planning commission seemed more concerned
with refining an inherently legislative process than achieving certainty by complying with
the spirit, as well as the letter, of Massey. Dodd, Zoning Proposal, supra note 19.
24. See Act to Permit Mecklenburg County to Engage in Conditional Zoning § 1(a)
(authorizing Mecklenburg County to employ a "conditional zoning district" that "shall not
require the issuance of a conditional use ... permit or permitting process apart from the
establishment of the district and its application to particular properties"); Act to Permit
the City of Charlotte and the Towns of Cornelius, Davidson, Huntersville, Matthews, Mint
Hill, and Pineville to Engage in Conditional Zoning § 1(a) (granting municipalities in the
county the same authority); Anna Griffin, Senate Approved Bill Allows Zoning to Resume,
CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, June 13, 2000, at 1B (explaining that the statutes authorize the
resumption of Charlotte's zoning process). The new laws authorize Mecklenburg County
and the City of Charlotte to engage in conditional zoning, a practice outlawed by Decker
v. Coleman, 6 N.C. App. 102, 107-08, 169 S.E.2d 487,491 (1969).
25. See Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 34. The legislation requires the council to make
decisions in light of overall land-use plans, prohibits lame-duck votes in the month after a
council election, and demands that developers meet with neighbors before seeking the
council's approval of a rezoning. Act to Permit Mecklenburg County to Engage in
Conditional Zoning § 1; Act to Permit the City of Charlotte and the Towns of Cornelius,
Davidson, Huntersville, Matthews, Mint Hill, and Pineville to Engage in Conditional
Zoning § 1. By expressly enabling Mecklenburg County and its municipalities to employ
an exclusively legislative process, the bill compromises the foundation of Judge Tennille's
opinion: that Charlotte had no authority under state law to use the procedure. See
Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 1 11; see also Griffin, supra note 24 (reporting the close
connection between the Massey holding and the General Assembly's action).
26. Act to Permit Mecklenburg County to Engage in Conditional Zoning §2; Act to
Permit the City of Charlotte and the Towns of Cornelius, Davidson, Huntersville,
Matthews, Mint Hill, and Pineville to Engage in Conditional Zoning §2; Griffin, supra
note 24. State Senator Dan Clodfelter, who sponsored the Senate bill, emphasized the
temporary nature of the legislation. See Griffin, supra note 24. "This gives [the Charlotte
City Council] a framework," he told reporters. Id. "It says if they want a permanent
solution, they have to come back next year." Id.
27. Smith Helms Mulliss, & Moore, L.L.P., Charlotte Rezoning Issue Finally
Resolved, City Council Adopted Zoning Ordinance Amendment Monday July 24th, at
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Appreciating Massey's implications requires an understanding of
conditional use zoning law in North Carolina.2 State courts have
struck down several attempts by local governments to hold
landowners to their promises to the zoning authority, such as contract
zoning and unreasonable spot zoning.29 North Carolina courts also
www.shmm.comlhottopics/realestate/resolution.htm (last visited May 15, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). The city's planning commission voted
unanimously to amend the local ordinance allowing rezonings based on the new
guidelines, and the Charlotte City Council approved the amendment on July 24, 2000. See
CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES app. A, §§ 6.103 (2000),
http://www.municode.com (last visited May 15, 2001); see also Act to Permit Mecklenburg
County to Engage in Conditional Zoning § 1 (authorizing Mecklenburg County to employ
conditional zoning); Act to Permit the City of Charlotte and the Towns of Cornelius,
Davidson, Huntersville, Matthews, Mint Hill, and Pineville to Engage in Conditional
Zoning § 1 (empowering these municipalities to use conditional zoning). The law
concerning Mecklenburg County suggests a degree of hesitance by the General Assembly.
It only applies to conditional zoning decisions made after the Massey decision was
announced, and it remains in effect only until August 31, 2001. Act to Permit
Mecklenburg County to Engage in Conditional Zoning § 2. Significantly, the legislation
"shall not affect any rezoning case that is the subject of pending litigation," which means
the new law should not disturb the Massey appeal. Id.
28. Since New York City passed the first zoning ordinance in 1916, city planners have
used zoning to regulate land use. See Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 128 N.E.
209, 209 (N.Y. 1920); see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926) (establishing the general validity of comprehensive zoning as a planning tool); 1
EDWARD H. ZEIGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF PLANNING AND ZONING § 1.01, at
1-16 (4th ed. 2000). This tool initially protected residential neighborhoods from
commercial and industrial encroachment and planners now employ it to regulate myriad
land uses. See id. § 1.01, at 1-17. The validity of zoning stems from the police power
inherent in the state's sovereign power to regulate behavior to protect the health, safety,
or general welfare of the community. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1046-47 (3d ed. 2000); ZEIGLER, supra, § 1.01, at 1-16. Like most
states, North Carolina delegated some of this power to local governments. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 160A-381 to -382 (1999). Consequently, zoning ordinances cannot exceed the
authority granted by the enabling legislation. See Heaton v. City of Charlotte, 277 N.C.
506, 513, 178 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1971) (maintaining that limitations in the enabling statute
constrain a municipality's authority to amend a zoning ordinance); Decker v. Coleman, 6
N.C. App. 102, 106, 169 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1969) (describing these enabling statutes as the
"sole source" of a municipality's power to zone). In addition to this constraint, local
governments must abide by restrictions on the police power itself. If a zoning regulation
appears unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious when applied to a specific parcel of
property, courts will generally find it invalid as an improper exercise of the police power.
See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
29. See Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 10; see also Decker, 6 N.C. at 109, 169 S.E.2d at
492 (deeming a landowner's promise to maintain a traffic-free buffer on one side of tract
unenforceable); STEPHEN E. DAVENPORT & PHILIP P. GREEN, JR., SPECIAL USE AND
CONDITIONAL USE DISTRICTS: A WAY TO IMPOSE MORE SPECIFIC ZONING CONTROLS
4-5 (1980). For example, municipalities may not engage in contract zoning, where the
landowner promises to use the tract in a specific way in exchange for the city council's
promise to approve the zoning application. See DAVENPORT & GREEN, supra, at 2-3. By
binding itself to a contract with the property owner, the city council impermissibly
surrenders the police power, which must be exercised in the public interest and not for
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forbid conditional zoning, where a city council imposes conditions in
the zoning ordinance for a specific tract that are not imposed on
similarly zoned tracts in the municipality. Conditional use district
zoning (not to be confused with conditional zoning) was designed to
give local governments the ability to hold landowners to their
promises without running afoul of prohibitions against contract
zoning, spot zoning, and conditional zoning.31 Under this scheme, a
landowner must request a rezoning to a conditional use district, and
the local government must issue a conditional use permit before any
desired use will be permitted. 2 By placing the conditions in the
permit, not in the zoning ordinance itself, this approach neatly avoids
the objectionable aspects of conditional zoning.33
private gain. See DAVID W. OWENS, LEGISLATIVE ZONING DECISIONS: LEGAL
ASPECTS 86 (2d ed. 1999). Such a case of "pure" contract zoning has not surfaced in
North Carolina, but state courts have invalidated zoning decisions based on implied
promises about a parcel's development. Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 545, 178
S.E.2d 432, 441 (1971) (invalidating as contract zoning a decision where the city
considered only the landowner's proposed use, not all permitted uses in the zoning
classification). Courts have also invalidated single-purpose zoning, where a municipality
crafts a new kind of zoning district for a landowner's property, permitting only the use
proposed by the landowner. See Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 653-54, 122
S.E.2d 817, 822 (1961) (concluding that a zoning ordinance cannot deprive a property
owner of the reasonable value of her land and all practical uses of it, including limiting
owners to a single use). Spot zoning, also prohibited in North Carolina in some
circumstances, applies single-purpose zoning to a relatively small tract of land enjoying
zoning different from the surrounding area. See Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C.
611, 625-27, 370 S.E.2d 579, 587-89 (1988); Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 549-
50, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45-46 (1972); OWENS, supra, at 72, 74-75. Spot zoning is legal in North
Carolina only if a local government can affirmatively show that its action was reasonable.
Id. at 76. The Chrismon court suggested that reasonable spot zoning would be permitted
if it met certain criteria. See Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 628, 370 S.E.2d at 589. Spot zoning
decisions are evaluated for reasonableness on a case-by-case basis using several factors
that "exist to provide guidelines for a judicial balancing of interests." Id. The factors
include: the size of the tract; compatibility with the locality's comprehensive plan; the
benefits and detriments to the owner, the neighbors, and the community; and the
relationship between the previous and the proposed uses of the property. Id.
30. See, e.g., Decker, 6 N.C. App. at 106-08, 169 S.E.2d at 490-91 (holding conditions
on a rezoning decision unenforceable on the landowner).
31. See DAVENPORT & GREEN, supra note 29, at 6. Conditional use district zoning
also avoids problems with single-purpose zoning, the practice of creating a new kind of
zoning district for each applicant's property, which permits only the use promised by the
landowner. Id. at 5.
32. d2 at 7. Practically, this means that any land use must be authorized by a
conditional use permit once the land has been rezoned as a conditional use district.
33. Id. at 8-9. North Carolina authorized conditional use district zoning in 1985,
amending the enabling statutes to give local governments more flexibility over zoning
decisions than the existing legal apparatus allowed. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-382 (1999).
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The flexibility of conditional use district zoning, however,
demands adherence to strict procedural guidelines.3M As initially
conceived, conditional use district zoning consisted of two steps: (1) a
legislative process to consider the rezoning requests,35 and (2) a quasi-
judicial proceeding to determine whether a permit is appropriate
under the circumstances presented by the application. 6 Different
standards of judicial review apply to each step. Judges generally
defer to the judgment of local officials regarding legislative zoning
decisions and intervene only to correct arbitrary or unreasonable
acts.37  In contrast, a local government's quasi-judicial decision to
issue a conditional use permit faces more rigorous scrutiny. 8 In
addition to acting reasonably, a municipality must act in good faith
based on findings of fact that are supported by competent evidence in
34. DAVENPORT & GREEN, supra note 29, at 10-12. The original champions of
conditional use district zoning, Stephen Davenport and Philip Green, warned that the
practice "is not for amateurs." Id at 10. A local government which is not "meticulous" in
following the process, they cautioned, "stands a good chance of not only having its
[conditional use] provisions invalidated by the courts but also (in extreme cases)
endangering its entire zoning ordinance." Id. Such "maladminstration," they warned,
"could be catastrophic." Id. at v.
35. Routine zoning decisions are legislative because they are made by elected officials
or their designees exercising the police power in the public interest. See supra notes 28-29
and accompanying text.
36. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Bd. of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 469-70, 202 S.E.2d
129, 136-37 (1974); Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 25-28; DAVENPORT & GREEN, supra
note 29, at 11-12. A landowner may apply to have her property rezoned to a conditional
use district and submit a conditional use permit application simultaneously. See Louis W.
Doherty, Comment, Chrismon v. Guilford County and Hall v. City of Durham:
Redefining Contract Zoning and Approving Conditional Use Zoning in North Carolina, 68
N.C. L. REv. 177,203 (1989). Regardless of the sequence, however, the municipality must
retain a quasi-judicial element. See Humble Oil, 284 N.C. at 471, 202 S.E.2d at 138.
Furthermore, the quasi-judicial decision to issue a permit must rely on "competent,
material, and substantial evidence that establishes the existence or nonexistence of the
facts" presented by the application. DAVENPORT & GREEN, supra note 29, at 12.
37. As the North Carolina Court of Appeals has noted, a court "may not substitute its
judgment for that of the legislative body concerning the wisdom of imposing restrictions
upon the use of properties within that body's legislative jurisdiction." Blades v. City of
Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 550, 187 S.E.2d 35, 46 (1972). The court may, however, "inquire
into procedures followed by the board ... and determine whether the ordinance was
adopted in violation of required procedures, or is arbitrary and without reasonable basis in
view of the established circumstances." Id. at 550-51, 187 S.E.2d at 46; see also In re
Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938) (elucidating the presumption of validity).
38. See Humble Oil, 284 N.C. at 469-70, 202 S.E.2d at 136-37; Zopfi v. City of
Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 438, 160 S.E.2d 325, 333 (1968). The theoretical explanation
for this difference lies in the distinction between legislative zoning decisions (enacting
public policy under the police power) and quasi-judicial decisions (applying that policy to
specific tracts). See OWENS, supra note 29, at 10-12; infra notes 42-44 and accompanying
text.
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the record of the proceeding.39 The quasi-judicial decision must be
insulated from "the whim of the decision-making body" and must
conform to due process requirements including notice, an opportunity
for parties to be heard, and an opportunity to confront opposing
witnesses4  The North Carolina Supreme Court signaled the
importance of this standard by qualifying its support for conditional
use district zoning with repeated warnings that it must be "properly
implemented."41
The Massey decision outlawing Charlotte's one-step conditional
use district zoning process arose from this context. Under the
enabling statute4 2 the court concluded, a conditional use district
zoning procedure requires a two-step process.43 Without the second
step, the quasi-judicial hearing, the zoning decision would be based
on the proposed use of the property-a classic illustration of illegal
contract zoning.44 Charlotte, by contrast, made a rezoning decision
and issued a permit in a single, legislative procedure.4' Almost by
definition, then, Charlotte's decision constituted either contract
zoning or an improperly executed conditional use district zoning.
46
Because either alternative exceeds a local government's authority
under the enabling statute, the zoning decision must be invalid.47
This reasoning, however, struggles to impose a false sense of
order on the somewhat unsettled state of zoning law in North
Carolina. In Massey, Judge Tennille asserted that courts have
invalidated "most methods of zoning which require a landowner to
develop his property in accordance with specific conditions or subject
39. See, e.g., Zopfi, 273 N.C. at 438,160 S.E.2d at 333.
40. DAVENPORT & GREEN, supra note 29, at 11-12; see also OWENS, supra note 29,
at 12 (listing the elements of quasi-judicial proceedings).
41. Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 622, 370 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1988). The
court added that conditional use district zoning must be "carried out properly" and
"carefully applied." Id. at 622-23, 370 S.E.2d at 586. The court also "hasten[ed] to add
that, just as this type of zoning can provide much-needed and valuable flexibility to the
planning efforts of local zoning authorities, it could also be easily abused." Id. at 622, 370
S.E.2d at 586.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-382 (1999); see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying
text (explaining the origin and function of enabling statutes in zoning).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-382; Massey, 2000 N.C.B.C. at 12.
44. Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 11; see, e.g., Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531,
550-51, 187 S.E.2d 35, 46 (1972) (invalidating as contract zoning Raleigh's decision to
rezone a tract based on the landowner's promised use of the property).
45. Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 34-35.
46. See id. 18-21.
47. See id. 34-35; supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text (describing the limits
of local government action under the enabling statutes).
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to certain limitations. '48 Since the 1970s, however, state courts have
recognized the need for more precise zoning tools. 49 Consequently,
the once-clear prohibitions against spot zoning, contract zoning, and
conditional zoning now appear less clear than in the past."
The uncertainty regarding rezoning rules arises mostly from the
North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Chrismon v. Guilford
County,5 which upheld the validity of conditional use district
zoning." The court expressly approved the practice because it
"add[s] a valuable and desirable flexibility to the planning efforts of
local authorities throughout [the] state. '53 In distinguishing contract
zoning from conditional use district zoning, the court held that the
latter "features merely a unilateral promise from the landowner"
regarding future use, instead of a bilateral contract binding the zoning
authority (and illegally surrendering the police power).54 Following
48. Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 11. This statement remains literally true; decisions
handed down in the late 1960s and early 1970s rejected zoning decisions that compelled
landowners to meet certain conditions. See Blades, 280 N.C. at 550, 187 S.E.2d at 46;
Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 546-47, 178 S.E.2d 432, 441 (1971); Decker v.
Coleman, 6 N.C. App. 102, 106-07, 169 S.E.2d 487,490-91 (1969).
49. Judge Tennille even noted this desire, a response to "fast-paced change" and
"significant growth" in North Carolina's metropolitan areas. Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct.
29. The opinion acknowledges that "[tihe sheer number of zoning decisions existing in
today's rapid growth areas makes the use of a quasi-judicial proceeding a burden on
zoning authorities in those areas." Id. In fact, the North Carolina Supreme Court
explicitly praised conditional use district zoning for its "valuable and desirable flexibility."
Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 622, 370 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1988). For evidence
of a desire for more flexibility in land use controls, see Judith Welch Wegner, Moving
Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the
Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 1038 (1987)
(providing theoretical support for more flexible ways of binding public officials and
private landowners); DAVENPORT & GREEN, supra note 29, at v (stating that the concept
of conditional use district zoning developed "in response to persistent requests from
planners and other local officials who wanted a legal war to hold developers to promises
made when they applied for their land"). Furthermore, a trend toward greater flexibility
in zoning arrangements has influenced zoning law since the 1920s. 1 PATRICK J. ROHAN,
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, § 5.01[1], at 5-3 n.2 (2000).
50. Much of this confusion arises from the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision
in Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 622, 370 S.E.2d at 586; see infra text accompanying notes 51-68.
The court's subsequent holding in Hall v. City of Durham further blurred the lines,
however, by rejecting the conclusion that "rezoning may not be based ... on assurances
that the applicant will make a specific use of the property." 323 N.C. 293, 297-98, 372
S.E.2d 564, 567 (1988). The court upheld the city's rezoning decision against the plaintiffs'
charge of contract zoning, but it invalidated the action on other grounds. Id. at 298-99,
305, 372 S.E.2d at 567-68, 572.
51. 322 N.C. 611,370 S.E.2d 579 (1988).
52. Id. at 617,370 S.E.2d at 583.
53. Id. at 622, 370 S.E. 2d at 586.
54. Id. at 636, 370 S.E.2d at 594. Under this formulation, the local zoning authority
retains its independence because it makes no reciprocal promise to the landowner. See id.
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Chrismon, constraints on zoning agreements between a local
government and a landowner became less rigid.5
The Chrismon decision blurred the legal landscape for
municipalities more than the clear-eyed language of Massey
suggests. 6 Before Chrismon, if a local government made a zoning
change based on a landowner's promise to construct a certain
building, that decision would have constituted illegal contract
zoning.5 7 Chrismon allowed local governments to consider a specific
development proposal when making a zoning decision, 8 but the court
failed to stipulate specific procedural guidelines for this function. 9
Charlotte's one-step legislative process exploited this omission and
forced the Massey court to determine exactly how much latitude
Chrismon afforded local governments.
The Massey opinion presumed that because Chrismon approved
conditional use district zoning for the purpose of allowing local
officials to consider a proposed land use when evaluating a zoning
application, 6° the North Carolina Supreme Court intended local
55. See Doherty, supra note 36, at 178; see also Wegner, supra note 49, at 1038
(arguing for "[p]ublic-private dealmaking as a means of fashioning land use controls" to
produce "a more flexible, equitable, and efficient approach").
56. See Doherty, supra note 36, at 179 (raising "serious questions" after Chrismon
about "the practical application of conditional use zoning"); see also Wegner, supra note
49, at 1038 (speculating that it "remains to be seen" whether new types of public-private
deal-making "can be brought to fruition" within legal constraints).
57. See Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 545, 178 S.E.2d 432, 441 (1971)
(holding that rezoning may only be effected by the exercise of legislative power rather
than by special arrangements with the owner of the land). To Justice Webb, who
dissented in Chrismon, the majority holding contradicted this principle and overruled
earlier decisions outlawing spot zoning and contract zoning on which Massey relies. See
Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 641-42, 370 S.E.2d at 597 (Webb, J., dissenting) (citing Blades v.
City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972); Allred, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432
(1971)).
58. To reiterate, this is the exact capability which conditional use district zoning
provides. Before its creation, a municipality considering specific uses of a tract when
rezoning it ran afoul of prohibitions against contract zoning and/or conditional zoning. See
supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
59. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 622, 370 S.E.2d at 586. The opinion quoted from the
relevant enabling statute, North Carolina General Statutes section 153A-342 (1987), which
required a conditional use permit but stopped short of describing a procedure for its
issuance. Id. at 621, 370 S.E.2d at 585 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-342 (1987)). It
also described Guilford County's two-step process, as "appropriate." Id. at 638, 370
S.E.2d at 595. The court recognized that conditional use district zoning "could lead to
private or public abuse of government power" and urged that certain "limiting standards"
must be "consistently and carefully applied." Id. at 622-23, 370 S.E.2d at 586. The
standards it described, however, merely prohibit contract and unreasonable spot zoning
and require that conditional use district zoning to be reasonable, in the public interest, and
neither arbitrary nor unduly discriminatory. Id.
60. See id. at 622, 370 S.E.2d at 586.
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officials to adhere to the two-step process.6' This interpretation of
Chrismon, the linchpin of Massey, rests on a solid foundation.62 The
Chrismon majority, however, also announced that North Carolina
was joining a "growing trend of jurisdictions in recognizing the
validity of properly employed conditional use zoning."'63 No other
jurisdiction, however, employed conditional use district zoning at the
time;' the court approved, perhaps unintentionally, a zoning
mechanism unique to North Carolina.65 The possibility existed, then,
that the court had joined other jurisdictions in approving conditional
zoning (as opposed to conditional use district zoning) of a sort
presumably outlawed in the state since 1969.66 Chrismon's ambiguous
61. See Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 35. Judge Tennille stated that this procedure
"was central to the [Chrismon] court's decision to uphold conditional use district zoning."
Id. 26. Further, according to Judge Tennille, "[t]o attempt to eliminate the quasi-judicial
aspect of conditional use district zoning runs afoul of the grant of authority" in the
enabling statute. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-382 (1999) (granting authority to
create conditional use districts "only upon the issuance of a... conditional use permit").
62. First, the enabling statute requires the issuance of a conditional use permit, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 160A-382, and a proceeding with quasi-judicial features. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 160A-388(a)-(g) (1999). Second, Chrismon deemed Guilford County's two-step
process of conditional use district zoning an "appropriate" procedure. Chrismon, 322 N.C.
at 638, 370 S.E.2d at 595. Third, including a quasi-judicial step bolsters protections for
adjacent property owners who may have limited legislative influence. See Massey, 2000
N.C. Bus. Ct. 27-29. The presumption of validity inherent in judicial review of
legislative zoning decisions, Judge Tennille concluded, "does not adequately protect
neighboring landowners who seek to prevent specific uses of adjacent property." Id. 27.
63. Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 621, 370 S.E.2d at 585. The Chrismon opinion improperly
cited cases involving conditional zoning to support its contention that other jurisdictions
endorsed conditional use district zoning. See Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 620 n.3, 370 S.E.2d at
585 n.3 (citing Haas v. City of Mobile, 265 So.2d 564, 565-66 (Ala. 1972)); Transamerica
Title Ins. Co. v. City of Tuscon, 533 P.2d 693, 696 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding the
power of municipalities to "impose conditions on zoning"); Warshaw v. City of Atlanta,
299 S.E.2d 552, 553 (Ga. 1983) (approving conditions on zoning imposed for the benefit of
neighbors "'to ameliorate the effects of the zoning change' ") (citing Gross v. Hall
County, 235 S.E.2d 379, 382 (Ga. 1977); Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. Newton, 183
N.E.2d 118, 122 (Mass. 1962) (deciding that conditions attached to a rezoning represented
"an appropriate and untainted exercise of the zoning power"); Sweetman v. Town of
Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277, 1289 (R.I. 1976) (accepting the state legislature's policy
decision to allow conditional zoning); City of Redmond v. Kezner, 517 P.2d 625, 630
(Wash. App. 1973) (holding that approval of a rezoning conditional upon a future event is
"entirely legal"). This ambiguity may have resulted from imprecise drafting, rather than a
desire to authorize conditional zoning.
64. See Doherty, supra note 36, at 209-10.
65. See id. at 209-10. The opinion's apparently mistaken reliance on rulings
upholding conditional zoning (as opposed to conditional use district zoning) encouraged
this impression. See supra note 63 (citing holdings in other states).
66. See Doherty, supra note 36, at 209-10; see also Decker v. Coleman, 6 N.C. App.
102, 107-08, 169 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1969) (invalidating conditional zoning). Conditional
zoning involves a one-step legislative hearing, replacing the quasi-judicial hearing with
other constitutional safeguards. See Doherty, supra note 36, at 202 (explaining that other
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conflation of conditional zoning and conditional use district zoning
produced an ad hoc zoning regime in North Carolina, resulting in
local governments employing a wide variety of conditional use district
zoning procedures. 67 Charlotte's argument in Massey that it had the
authority to engage in a purely legislative process of conditional use
district zoning illustrates the effect of Chrismon's ambiguous
language.' Massey, in this context, represents an attempt to limit the
procedural liberties taken by local governments in the wake of
Chrismon's muddled diction.69
The General Assembly's intervention 7° has further confused the
issue. Under new legislation authorizing conditional zoning in
Mecklenburg County until August 2001,71 North Carolina has parallel
zoning rules: one set for Mecklenburg County and municipalities
inside its borders and another for the rest of the state. In most of the
state, local governments employ a legislative process to make zoning
decisions and may not consider a specific use in making that zoning
decision.72 Once the rezoning has occurred, the municipality then
holds a quasi-judicial hearing to issue a conditional use permit for the
specific use.7' Because the intricacies of conditional use district
zoning procedures vary widely across the state,74 and because
states tolerate conditional zoning as long as the decision would have been appropriate
without the conditions). Such a rule has never been part of North Carolina's zoning
scheme. See OWENS, supra note 29, at 97. It allows municipalities, before approving a
rezoning, to extract promises from a developer in exchange for a promise not to change
the zoning ordinance for a period of time-the essence of contract zoning. See ROHAN,
supra note 49, § 5.01, at 5-9 n.8 and accompanying text.
67. See Lori Johnston, Zoning Processes Vary By City, Bus. J. OF CHARLOTrE, Apr.
21, 2000, at 66; Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission, Conditional Rezoning
Processing in Other Cities, at www.ci.charlotte.nc.us/ciplanning/rezsub/rezoning/
newcdrezoningprocess/othercities.htm (last modified May 9, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Conditional Rezoning]. Typically, local governments
"consider the rezoning and the permit at the same time, with both decisions made by the
governing board." OWENS, supra note 29, at 94.
68. See Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 22.
69. See Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 31 (noting that the Chrismon court "failed to
properly distinguish between" conditional use district zoning and conditional zoning).
70. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
71. An Act to Permit Mecklenburg Count to Engage in Conditional Zoning, 2000
N.C. Sess. Law 77 (2000); An Act to Permit the City of Charlotte and the Towns of
Cornelius, Davidson, Huntersville, Matthews, Mint Hill, and Pineville to Engage in
Conditional Zoning, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 84 (2000).
72. See, e.g., Conditional Rezoning, supra note 67.
73. DAVENPORT & GREEN, supra note 29, at 11-12; OWENS, supra note 29, at 93-94.
The issuance of a permit is required under section 160A-382 of the North Carolina
General Statutes. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-382 (1999).
74. See Johnston, supra note 67. Nearly all municipalities in the state require a two-
step process, but the steps can take place concurrently after a single hearing. See OWENS,
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Charlotte was a pioneer in aggressively pursuing the semantic
ambiguity in Chrismon, Massey appears to have had little effect on
municipalities outside of Mecklenburg County 5 Within the county,
however, local governments now have the temporary statutory
authority to approve a rezoning using a single-step, purely legislative
process, subject to deferential judicial review, and may consider the
tract's proposed use in making the zoning decision. 6 In short, the
new law can be viewed as authorizing conditional zoning and contract
zoning in Mecklenburg County-thereby contradicting over thirty
years of state-wide jurisprudence to the contrary.77 Because the
legislation applies only to local governments in Mecklenburg County,
other municipalities may not engage in conditional zoning unless the
court of appeals overturns Massey.78
In its brief to the court of appeals, Charlotte sought to exploit the
confusion over conditional use district zoning by insisting that it
engaged in conditional zoning, not conditional use district zoning, as
supra note 29, at 94. Wilmington and Greensboro employ a quasi-judicial hearing that
includes sworn testimony. Johnston, supra note 67; see also Conditional Rezoning, supra
note 67 (describing rezoning procedures elsewhere in North Carolina to guide Charlotte's
response to Massey). Winston-Salem also uses a two-step process, featuring council
approval of the rezoning apart from its decision on a specific site plan. Johnston, supra
note 67; Conditional Rezoning, supra note 67. Raleigh avoids zoning property for a
particular use whenever possible. Johnston, supra note 67; Conditional Rezoning, supra
note 67. Only Cary's system resembles Charlotte's. Johnston, supra note 67; Conditional
Rezoning, supra note 67.
75. See Richard Stradling, Superior Court Decision Probably Will Not Alter Triangle
Zoning, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 25, 2000, at 3B. In the Research
Triangle, for example, several counties and towns use the prescribed two-step process,
while other jurisdictions have zoning procedures explicitly authorized by special state
legislation. Id. Should the courts overturn the Massey decision, however, local
governments may be enticed to change radically their zoning procedures. The town of
Chapel Hill, for example, has entertained the notion of jettisoning its two-step, conditional
use district zoning procedure in favor of a less confrontational method. See Anne Blythe,
Town Mulls Development Review, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 20, 2000, at
4B. This proposal, initiated by outside consultants, had the strong support of the local
Chamber of Commerce. See id.
76. Act to Permit Mecklenburg County to Engage in Conditional Zoning, 2000 N.C.
Sess. Laws 77; Act to Permit the City of Charlotte and the Towns of Cornelius, Davidson,
Huntersville, Matthews, Mint Hill, and Pineville to Engage in Conditional Zoning, 2000
N.C. Sess. Laws 84.
77. Cf. Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 639-40, 370 S.E.2d 579, 596
(1989); Hall v. City of Durham, 323 N.C. 293, 305, 372 S.E.2d 564, 572 (1988); Blades v.
City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 550-51, 187 S.E.2d 35, 46 (1972); Allred v. City of Raleigh,
277 N.C. 530, 546, 178 S.E.2d 432, 441 (1971); Decker v. Coleman, 6 N.C. App. 102, 107-
08, 169 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1969).
78. Using Massey's logic, other local governments may not engage in conditional
zoning under the existing enabling statute. See Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 16.
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authorized by the enabling statute.79 The city urges the court "to limit
its consideration to the singular question" of whether statutory
authority existed for Charlotte's legislative process of conditional
zoning, and "to do so with an understanding that the outcome of this
case will have no effect" beyond the facts of this zoning decision.80
Stated bluntly, the city hopes the court of appeals will issue a narrow
decision, neglect to clarify Chrismon, and leave unresolved the
possibility that conditional zoning is permissible in North Carolina
based on temporary legislation.81
The legal setback to Charlotte's zoning process has unsettled
groups on both sides of the zoning debate. Developers have reason
for concern about more frequent lawsuits; another community group
sued the City of Charlotte over a zoning decision in the weeks
following the Massey decision.' In turn, invigorated neighborhood
79. Brief for the City of Charlotte at 7, Massey v. City of Charlotte, No. COAOO-905,
(N.C. Ct. App. filed May 16, 2000). Charlotte's position appears to be that the enabling
statute empowers local governments to engage in conditional zoning. See id. at 7-8. The
"Conditional Use District Permit" issued to Albemarle, the city claims, was "a superfluous
vestige of an earlier zoning practice," not a conditional use permit required by statute. Id.
Prior to the adoption of a new zoning code in 1991, Charlotte had issued a "parallel
conditional use permit" to landowners approved for conditional rezoning. Record at 102,
Massey v. City of Charlotte, No. COA0O-905 (N.C. Ct. App. filed May 16, 2000) (affidavit
of Fred Ernest Bryant). This practice did not imply that the city engaged, then or since, in
conditional use zoning. Brief for the City of Charlotte at 7, Massey (No. COA0O-905).
80. Brief for the City of Charlotte at 8-9, Massey (No. COA00-905).
81. The question before the court of appeals is whether to enter this quagmire, and, if
so, how to clean it up. The court has several options. First, it could uphold Judge
Tennille's decision, making Charlotte's process illegal without specific legislative
authority. This scenario may seem unlikely because of the General Assembly's action in
the summer of 2000, but the Act authorizing Charlotte's zoning procedure specifically
exempted any decision pending appellate review. See Act to Permit Mecklenburg County
to Engage in Conditional Zoning § 2 (stating that the act "shall not apply to conditional
zoning petitions that were approved or denied ... prior to April 17, 2000 [the date of the
Massey decision], and shall not affect any rezoning case that is the subject of pending
litigation"); Act to Permit the City of Charlotte and the Towns of Cornelius, Davidson,
Huntersville, Matthews, Mint Hill, and Pineville to Engage in Conditional Zoning § 2
(applying identical language to municipalities in Mecklenburg County). Second, the Court
could acknowledge the General Assembly's action, but uphold the spirit of Massey: that
conditional use zoning requires a quasi-judicial hearing subject to heightened scrutiny.
Third, it could rule the issue moot and pass on the question now that the General
Assembly has corrected, even temporarily, the lack of statutory authority. Fourth, the
court could announce that the city council's judgment, as a legislative body, does not
warrant strict judicial review-a holding tantamount to reversing the lower court. Fifth, it
could directly overturn Massey, essentially allowing conditional zoning in North Carolina.
Such a ruling would approve conditional zoning throughout the state. This final result
seems more plausible from the state supreme court.
82. Scott Dodd, City Sued Again on Zoning Process, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, June 1,
2000, at lB. More disturbing, the hotly contested rezoning of SouthPark mall to allow new
development spawned another lawsuit. Scott Dodd, SouthPark-Area Residents Sue City,
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activism and the threat of litigation may drive local governments to
be more cautious in their zoning decisions devote more attention to
building a defensible record that can withstand appellate scrutiny.83
The heightened attention from developers and residents, as well as
the newly-codified principles of conditional zoning in the General
Assembly's one-year authorizing statute, place a premium on
development that is consistent with adopted land-use plans. 4 To
determine if proposals are consistent with these plans, council
members will likely rely more heavily on the city's planning staff,
who, in turn, will face increased pressure to provide more recent and
detailed small-area plans.15 The new law also requires a formally
documented community meeting or reasonable attempts to hold
one.86 This requirement will likely cause logistical complications and
demand better record keeping by rezoning applicantsY Developers
might also be concerned that local officials will defer granting a
rezoning unless the community has been heard formally on the
Mall Owner, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 12,2000, at 1B [hereinafter Dodd, SouthPark-
Area Residents]. The suit also targets Carnegie Town Center, a mixed-use development
close to the mall. Id. Predictably, the first skirmish in the SouthPark case revolved
around whether to certify the dispute as a "complex legal case," a move that would land
the parties in Judge Tennille's courtroom. See Scott Dodd, SouthPark Foes Fight Over
Judge for Case, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Jan. 5, 2001, at lB. The high profile of these
cases has Charlotte's development community "skittish about another legal battle" and
frustrated by the possibility of more zoning delays. Dodd, SouthPark-Area Residents,
supra.
83. Mark C. Cramer & Bailey Patrick, Jr., NAIOP Luncheon Presentation, Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Conditional Use Rezoning Process: Overview and Update, at 14 (2000) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Developing an adequate record facilitates
judicial review and the protection of rights, but it also impedes zoning decisions. This
illustrates the elusive balance local governments must find between spurring economic
development and protecting the interests of neighboring property owners.
84. Id. at 15. The statute mandates consideration of a local government's
comprehensive plan in zoning decisions, thus highlighting such development. See Act to
Permit Mecklenburg County to Engage in Conditional Zoning, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 77;
Act to Permit the City of Charlotte and the Towns of Cornelius, Davidson, Huntersville,
Matthews, Mint Hill, and Pineville to Engage in Conditional Zoning, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws
84. As the basis for its legal challenge to new development at SouthPark mall, area
residents point to Charlotte's failure to consider its long-range plans for land use and
transit when approving the rezoning. See Dodd, SouthPark-Area Residents, supra note 82.
85. Cramer & Patrick, supra note 83, at 15.
86. See Act to Permit Mecklenburg County to Engage in Conditional Zoning, 2000
N.C. Sess. Laws 77; Act to Permit the City of Charlotte and the Towns of Cornelius,
Davidson, Huntersville, Matthews, Mint Hill, and Pineville to Engage in Conditional
Zoning, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 84.
87. See Act to Permit Mecklenburg County to Engage in Conditional Zoning, 2000
N.C. Sess. Laws 77; Act to Permit the City of Charlotte and the Towns of Cornelius,
Davidson, Huntersville, Matthews, Mint Hill, and Pineville to Engage in Conditional
Zoning, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 84.
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matter. This constraint will reduce the effectiveness of ex parte
communications and slow the zoning process.' In fact, the Massey
plaintiffs sought to achieve precisely this result, among others.8 9
Developers championed Charlotte's rezoning procedure because
it had the capacity to expedite growth.9 By condensing the process to
one step, foregoing the potentially time-consuming quasi-judicial
requirements, developers could receive the zoning decision and
conditional use permit quickly.91 The additional step required by
Massey constitutes, to some developers, an "additional procedural
hurdle" that merely slows and complicates the process. 92
Developers eager to retain an exclusively legislative process
should also consider, however, the inherently unpredictable nature of
local politics.93 Local governments may welcome development for a
time, as municipalities prove willing to test the limits of their
88. Cramer & Patrick, supra note 83, at 16; see also Scott Dodd, Real Battle Waged,
supra note 4 (explaining that lobbying over the expansion of SouthPark Mall would take
place largely in living rooms, not in public forums). The Massey opinion acknowledges
that "[t]he sheer number of zoning decisions existing in today's rapid growth areas makes
the use of a quasi-judicial proceeding a burden on zoning authorities in those areas."
Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 29.
89. "Our ultimate goal here is to have a process that works," one Albemarle resident
declared, "something that gives the public equal input to the developers, without all the
back-door shenanigans." Scott Dodd, City Asks State to Revise Charter to Clarify
Conditional Zoning Power, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Apr. 12,2000, at lB.
90. Advocates for developers applaud the speed of the one-step procedure and its
permissive approach to ex parte communications. See Howard, Developers in Limbo,
supra note 17; Doug Smith, A Village at South Park, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 26,
2000, at ID; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the pervasive belief in
the development community that Charlotte's procedure discourages conflict and fosters
compromise).
91. The proposed expansion of Charlotte's SouthPark Mall demonstrates just how
quickly such decisions may be issued. Because of its scale, the development raised serious
questions about the character of regional economic development, in addition to local
concerns such as the impact on adjacent neighborhoods and increased traffic. To confront
such complicated issues surrounding "the toughest zoning fight in Charlotte history," the
city council scheduled a mere fifteen minutes per side to articulate their views on the
rezoning proposal. Dodd, Real Battle Waged, supra note 4. The Massey decision delayed
consideration of the proposal, but the city council unanimously approved the developer's
request in October, triggering a lawsuit by neighboring residents. Scott Dodd, South Park-
Area Residents, supra note 82.
92. Cramer & Patrick, supra note 83, at 18.
93. Lyndon B. Johnson, perhaps the most accomplished practitioner of American
legislative politics in the twentieth century, once told a staff member that in any
democratic process (including local government), "Things get done only by agreement
between opposing forces. The best decisions are neither bought [n]or sold. Before you do
anything, your last thought ought to be 'I've got to live with the son-of-a-bitch.' "
RICHARD N. GOODWIN, REMEMBERING AMERICA: A VOICE FROM THE SIXTIES 260
(1988).
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infrastructures and surge into the surrounding countryside.94 But as
the costs of development increase, including long commutes, crowded
schools, and strained water and sewer resources, a backlash seems
likely and may have started already.' The power of community
groups has grown in recent years. Further, their tactics have
expanded from protests at board meetings to methods such as hiring
lawyers and consultants, using information technology to publicize
their concerns, and joining anti-growth coalitions.96 If these trends
continue, rapid development could become unpopular in Charlotte.
97
94. See ADDING IT UP, supra note 1, at 11 (ranking North Carolina fifth among states
in farm land consumed by development between 1992 and 1997). Charlotte alone
developed 150,758 acres of farmland between 1980 and 1990. Id. at 12. Between 1992 and
1997, urban areas in the state consumed new land so quickly that an area the size of
Charlotte was developed each year. Id. at 16.
95. As Charlotte planning commission member Mary Hopper has admitted, "We are
at a crucial juncture right now ... because clearly there's some suspicion of us." Scott
Dodd, Charlotte Planning Board Leader Leaving, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 26,2000,
at 1B; see also Editorial, The "Hows" of Growth, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Oct. 10, 2000, at 10A (noting "growing concern in the state about overburdened highways,
bad air, overcrowded schools, an ever-increasing assault on forests and farmland, and the
availability and safety of water supplies"); Scott Dodd, Neighborhoods Flex Their Muscle,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 7,2000, at 1A [hereinafter Dodd, Neighborhoods Flex]. A
reaction against development in Charlotte could draw upon plentiful political fuel. The
American Lung Association ranked the Charlotte metropolitan area eighth worst in the
nation for air quality. AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, State of Air 2001, at 10 tbl. 3.
Another study found that the number of vehicle miles traveled on the Charlotte area's
freeways more than doubled since 1990; the amount of fuel wasted each year due to traffic
congestion also doubled. ADDING IT UP, supra note 1, at 12. Other North Carolina cities
have already experienced significant backlash to growth. Cary elected its mayor, Glen
Lang, based on a transparently anti-developer platform. "You'd have to be out your
mind," Lang told a reporter, to "actually want the special interests to control their
politicians." Damien Jackson, Beneath the Makeup, INDEP. WKLY. (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan.
17-23, 2001, at 10. In Chapel Hill, the town council is currently revising the development
ordinance. According to one town planner, "[w]e're already battening down the hatches"
against undesirable growth. Nancy E. Oates, The "A" List for the New Year, CHAPEL
HILL NEWS, Jan. 21, 2001, at D1.
96. See Steven Rosenberg, Zoning Process Leaves Residents Disillusioned, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 17, 2000, at 2B (describing myriad tactics by
neighborhood groups). At one rezoning hearing, for example, each county commissioner
had an inch-high stack of handwritten postcards opposing the proposal. See, e.g., Dodd,
Neighborhoods Flex, supra note 95 (assessing the growing strength of community
activism).
97. See Markoe, supra note 2 (reporting that expressions of frustration with the
zoning process have become increasingly frequent and vehement). Expressions of
discontent with Charlotte's pattern of development have already surfaced. When radio
host Juan Williams visited the city and called it "the poster child of sprawl," a
commentator in Charlotte's daily newspaper pronounced him "right." See Don Hudson,
Let's Build Something Memorable, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 1, 2001, at lB. The
editors encouraged city leaders to admit "that in recent history, facing a decision about
growth, we have routinely torn down more trees or buildings." Id. Further, they called for
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If the membership of the city council begins to reflect this political
reality, developers may long for a judicial process to protect their
interests. 8
Developers hostile to a quasi-judicial process should also
consider that a procedural vent for community frustration might
postpone political backlash. In a purely legislative process, the ballot
box provides the only effective weapon for a disenchanted public.99 If
the political winds shift, developers have much to lose."° Confronted
with a city council dominated by slow-growth community activists,
developers would likely complain about an exclusively legislative
process."' Under Charlotte's current rezoning scheme, the council's
hostile decision would be subject to deferential judicial review.
102
"a different age.... It's time our public servants ... listen[ed] to the voices of those who
want a better city. Not just the influential who want more." Id.
98. See, e.g., Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 370-72, 384 S.E.2d 8, 19-20
(1989) (upholding the rezoning of a tract from commercial to residential use where the
rezoning resulted in diminished property value but did not deprive the landowner of all
practical use of the property); see also Telephone Interview with H.L. Owens, Partner,
Owens & Lapinel, P.A., (Sept. 11, 2000) (predicting that a developer to whom council has
denied a conditional rezoning would pose the most effective challenge to a strictly
legislative process).
99. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 96 (analyzing neighbors' efforts to fight a rezoning
in Raleigh with organizations, petitions, and Web sites, only to discover that they were
"na'fve" about their chances through the political process).
100. In addition to access, developers would lose their considerable investment in
gaining that access. From January 1, 1998, through June 30, 2000, local candidates in the
Research Triangle received $1.3 million in campaign contributions, of which the
development industry contributed $550,000. Editorial, Investment in Access, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 31, 2000, at 10A; see, e.g., Don Wood, So Far, 'Planning'
Hasn't Worked-But It Can, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 1, 2000, at 9A
(suggesting that city officials establish local population goals, then refuse to authorize new
development, stop building highways, water storage facilities, schools, hospitals, and
sewage treatment plants). Statewide, development and real estate interests contributed
$1.3 million to successful General Assembly candidates in the year 2000, more than any
other group besides the health care industry. Lynn Bonner & David Raynor, Campaign
Donors Await Decisions, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 8,2001, at 1A. If anti-
growth fervor escalates, and frustrated community activists resort to drastic measures,
developers could lose their investment altogether. See, e.g., Al Baker, Police say an Anti-
Sprawl Group Burned New Long Island Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,2001, at B1 (reporting
a radical environmental group's vandalism and arson of new developments on Long Island
and elsewhere).
101. Finch, 325 N.C. at 370-72, 384 S.E.2d at 19-20, illustrates the reasons for these
complaints. In Finch, a parcel originally zoned for residential use was rezoned for office
use, then rezoned again back to residential. Id. at 355, 384 S.E.2d at 10; OWENS, supra
note 29, at 349-50. Under a purely legislative regime, the city council could make these
changes without a good faith requirement or the need to base the decisions on competent
evidence. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of
validity in judicial review of legislative zoning decisions). Davidson, a college town in
danger of becoming a bedroom community for Charlotte commuters, imposed a
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Similarly, neighborhood activists celebrating the Massey decision
might have cause to reconsider. By adding a quasi-judicial
component to the rezoning process, community groups must ensure
that they receive effective representation. 1 3 By winning procedural
fairness, community activists ultimately may sacrifice practical results
in a climate where only a well-organized, well-financed opposition
can succeed.1' 4 The added procedural requirement may afford
wealthy neighborhoods a better chance to fend off unwanted
development than poorer communities. Neighborhoods would also
lose the ability to win solely on political grounds. °5 Large numbers of
angry, motivated citizens might influence a rezoning hearing, but to
survive judicial review of a quasi-judicial decision, a city council must
support its resolution with objective, credible evidence."° As
resistance to development grows, a purely legislative process might
moratorium on new subdivisions and commercial development last year. Scott Dodd &
Casey Jacobus, Davidson Vote Puts Building on Hold, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Nov. 16,
2000, at lB. At least one developer, who had invested $500,000 in land on the edge of
town, stood to lose $30,000 a month because of the decision. See id. "It may be legal, but
that doesn't make it right," he reluctantly admitted. Id. Developers eager to lift the
moratorium planned to sue the town. See Scott Dodd, Showdown Looms on Davidson
Growth, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 5, 2000, at 3B. Town leaders "can't just keep
adopting moratoriums and keep people from exercising their property rights," the
spokesman for one builder complained. Id.
102. Courts adhere to a presumption of validity when reviewing legislative zoning
decisions. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
103. Howard, Developers in Limbo, supra note 17 (quoting real estate attorney Adam
Foodman predicting that "[p]eople will be forced to hire someone like me, and that can be
expensive"). "The neighborhood won, but they lost" the Massey decision, one Charlotte
City Council member concluded. Dodd, 17 Fought City Hall, supra note 10. "The process
is going to be much more limited now. Neighborhoods will have to defend their case, and
they aren't prepared to do it like developers are." Id. Another city official worried about
a zoning process "so complex and expensive for neighborhood groups that there will be a
bias toward developers." Dodd & Markoe, supra note 17.
104. A former Charlotte city planner predicted "that people will look back in three or
four years longingly at the process that just got thrown out" in Massey. Dodd & Markoe,
supra note 17. Not all city planners share this view. Bill Ruska, Greensboro's zoning
administrator, remains convinced that the more formal constraints of a quasi-judicial
hearing do not intimidate citizens to such an extent that they cannot present their case.
See Dodd, 17 Fought City Hall, supra note 10.
105. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (noting that to survive judicial
review, a local government must demonstrate that it acted in good faith, based on credible
evidence).
106. See supra note 37-40 and accompanying text. Residents could influence a
legislative process by merely asserting that a development will increase traffic and
decrease property values, but credible evidence must support such assertions under quasi-
judicial rules. See Doug Smith, Judge's Ruling Forces New Approach to Rezoning,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 19, 2000, at ID (claiming that this change may "make
emotion much less of a factor").
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eventually benefit neighborhood groups.'" In a slow-growth political
climate, the quasi-judicial step would provide council members
political shelter for unpopular zoning decisions; elected officials could
claim that the politically expedient course would not survive rigorous
judicial review.0 s Strong emotions and threatened reprisals in the
next local election may be necessary to achieve the goals of
community activists, but the protections of a quasi-judicial process
make these political considerations alone insufficient to impose
conditions on a proposed rezoning.'09
All told, however, North Carolina residents' celebration of
Massey and their support for quasi-judicial conditional use district
zoning is justified."0 The quasi-judicial process upheld by Massey
provides an important forum for opponents of conditional use district
zoning decisions."' Because elected officials or their designees sit in
judgment, the legislative hearing may not provide the full protections
of a regular courtroom." 2  Nonetheless, quasi-judicial decisions
remain subject to rigorous scrutiny by appellate courts, in venues
107. Where anti-sprawl forces dominate local government, quasi-judicial requirements
may hinder policies that are aggressively hostile to development. As Charlotte Mayor Pat
McCrory observed, "I think the voters are willing to move even faster than we are
sometimes" to curb growth. Dodd, Slow Answers, supra note 1. Even in presently
growth-happy Charlotte, neighboring residents of SouthPark Mall forced the developer to
scale back expansion plans. See Don Hudson, SouthPark Win Carries a Price Tag,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 19, 2000, at lB. Although the final proposal won
unanimous approval from the city council, it had been shorn of plans for two new office
buildings, a large hotel, and one hundred residential units. I&
A council rejecting a rezoning request for development purposes must act in good
faith based on competent evidence. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text; cf.
supra note 100-02 and accompanying text (observing that developers may welcome quasi-
judicial protections when the political winds blow against them).
108. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (explaining judicial review of quasi-
judicial decisions).
109. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements to
withstand judicial review of quasi-judicial decisions).
110. Residents appearing before the Chapel Hill Town Council voiced their suspicions
that a less adversarial system without a quasi-judicial process would lead to faster, easier
development and undermine the democratic process. See Anne Blythe, Council May
Revise Planning Ordinance, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 20, 2000, at 1B
(quoting warnings from one council member against "a wholesale change in the way we do
business" as a zoning authority).
111. See Massey, 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 27. As Judge Tennille explained, "the protection
at the ballot box comes too late and does not sufficiently protect an individual landowner
from a rezoning decision made by council members outside her district." Id
112. See section 160A-388(g) of the North Carolina General Statutes for procedural
requirements of quasi-judicial hearings. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-388(g) (1999).
According to Nancy Vaughn, a member of the Greensboro City Council and a former
community activist, the quasi-judicial process "actually gives the neighbors a bit more
power" than a purely legislative system. Dodd, 17 Fought City Hall, supra note 10.
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more removed from the vicissitudes of local politics than open city
council meetings." Without this step, in a purely legislative process,
well-connected developers enjoy an enormous advantage over
unorganized local people suddenly threatened by the rising tide of
rapid development.11 4 The "consensus and compromise" championed
by advocates of Charlotte's method allow developers to negotiate
with neighbors who have fewer resources and less chance to act in an
organized fashion."' Put plainly, "[d]evelopers are awfully good at
huddling with politicians," but too often "[r]egular people prefer to
stay as far away from politicians as possible." '116 Stripping the
conditional use district zoning process of its quasi-judicial element
thus deprives community groups a chance to face developers on equal
terms. Left to fend for themselves in a purely legislative process,
residents remain inherently disadvantaged. As Judge Tennille
113. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of review
for quasi-judicial decisions). City council members generally serve shorter terms than
appellate judges, making them more immediately responsive to the whims of the voters.
Charlotte City Council members, for instance, serve two-year terms. See CHARLOTTE,
N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.03 (2000), http://wwxv.municode.com (last visited May
15, 2001). City Council members also serve in transparently political positions, overtly
representing the interests of constituents. Some observers suggest that North Carolina's
practice of electing appellate judges exposes them to similar pressures. Mark Hansen, A
Run for the Bench, 84 A.B.A. J. 68, 68 (Oct. 1998).
114. The notion that political activity disadvantages disorganized residents compared
to better-funded, better-organized, and better-connected groups stems from pluralist
political theory. See, e.g, ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND EQUALITY
244 (1986) (defining "the struggle of individuals and groups to gain autonomy in relation
to the control of others" as "a fundamental tendency of political life"); ROBERT A. DAHL,
DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 1-3 (1982) (explaining that groups organized to
influence political decisions are necessary to the functioning of the democratic process, but
they also have the capacity to inflict harm on that process); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 35-37 (1993) (describing "reasonable pluralism" as "a permanent feature of
the public culture of democracy").
115. H.L. Owens, the plaintiffs' lawyer in the Massey case, was paid by passing a hat at
community meetings. Compare interview with H.L. Owens, supra note 98 (describing her
fee arrangement) with Record at 105, Massey v. City of Charlotte, No. COA00-905 (N.C.
Ct. App. filed May 16, 2000) (affidavit of Stan Campbell) (citing consensus and
compromise as effective ways for developers to limit conflict in zoning disputes). This
complaint simply applies the nearly universal castigation of well-funded "special interests"
in American politics to the local level. The plaintiffs represented a diverse group of
middle-class residents, including a homemaker, a building contractor, and a retired city
firefighter. Dodd, 17 Fought City Hall, supra note 10. When they approached Owens, she
told them, "I don't know anything about zoning law, but you can't afford anybody that
does." Id.
116. Tommy Tomlinson, Best Rezoning Policy? Let Light Shine, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Apr. 19, 2000, at 1B ("[W]hen homeowners go up against developers, it's like
a featherweight taking on George Foreman.").
117. In the Research Triangle, for example, the development industry contributed
$550,000 of a total $1.3 million campaign donations to local politicians between January
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concluded, "No matter how burdensome to governmental authorities,
the protection afforded individual property owners in a quasi-judicial
process must be preserved," ' 8 despite the exigencies of rapid
development. Because of that protection, city council members may
still "walk off arm-in-arm with developers, but at least the rest of us
will get to hear the line they fell for.""19
STEPHEN C. KEADEY
1998 and June 2000. Editorial, Investment in Access, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Oct. 31, 2000, at 10A. Partly because of this disparity in access, David Owens, a leading
authority on zoning in North Carolina, advises avoiding zoning procedures "where it's
strictly political and whoever has the most muscle gets whatever they want." Dodd &
Markoe, supra note 17.
118. 2000 N.C. Bus. Ct. 29.
119. Tomlinson, supra note 116.
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